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I. INTRODUCTION 
A basic tenet of American criminal law is the distinction 
between facts that are elements of an offense and facts that a 
sentencing authority may find when selecting an appropriate 
sentence within a statutory range.1  The Fifth Amendment 
protection from double jeopardy and the Sixth Amendment right 
to a jury trial apply to the former, but not the latter.2  Recent 
United States Supreme Court decisions, specifically Blakely v. 
Washington3 and Apprendi v. New Jersey,4 drew a bright line marking 
this distinction.5  These rulings rendered Minnesota’s sentencing 
guidelines unconstitutional because, under the guidelines, judges 
found the aggravating factors necessary to allow an upward 
departure from the presumptive sentence range.6  In other words, 
aggravating factors in Minnesota’s sentencing guideline scheme are 
elements of an offense to be found by a jury and are thus subject to 
the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. 
Dena Lyn Hankerson was sentenced to a 264-month prison 
term, including a 120-month upward departure based on judicially-
found aggravating factors.7  Applying Blakely retroactively, a post-
conviction court held that the sentence was unconstitutional and 
scheduled a “resentencing jury trial” without overturning the 
underlying conviction.8  In Hankerson v. State, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court held that the resentencing trial did not violate 
double jeopardy.9  But the court’s conclusion is based on precedent 
that is distinguishable from Hankerson, and policy suggests that 
double jeopardy should apply.  The court’s decision also implicates 
the use of offensive collateral estoppel by the prosecution, which 
the court did not discuss.  Furthermore, the Hankerson court 
avoided deciding whether aggravating factors figure into the “same 
offense” analysis, leaving open the question of whether double 
jeopardy applies at all to aggravating factors. 
 1. See Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721, 737–39 (1998) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
 2. U.S. CONST. amend. V-VI; Monge, 524 U.S. at 737 (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(agreeing with the majority). 
 3. 542 U.S. 296 (2004). 
 4. 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
 5. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303–04; Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490. 
 6. State v. Shattuck, 704 N.W.2d 131, 143 (Minn. 2005). 
 7. Hankerson v. State, 723 N.W.2d 232, 234 (Minn. 2006). 
 8. Id. at 235. 
 9. Id. at 239. 
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This note outlines the fundamentals of jury review and double 
jeopardy, and then it analyzes the Hankerson decision.  Part II 
discusses the jurisprudence upon which Hankerson is based.10  Part 
II.A discusses the right to jury review, with the primary aim of 
explaining the line of Supreme Court cases that led to Blakely.11  
Part II.B reviews double-jeopardy jurisprudence.12  This note 
emphasizes two major, recent reversals of double-jeopardy 
precedent in order to give an idea of how malleable the law has 
been in recent history and how slippery the analysis is.  Admittedly, 
Part II indulges in a lengthy treatment of double-jeopardy 
jurisprudence, some of which is not absolutely necessary to develop 
the analysis of Hankerson.  But by including the treatment it is my 
hope to provide a self-contained and succinct summary of double-
jeopardy law that might aid those looking for a quick synopsis of 
the law as it stands now.  Part III describes the Hankerson facts and 
the majority’s reasoning.13  Part IV critiques the Hankerson analysis.14  
Part IV.B criticizes the Hankerson court’s use of double-jeopardy 
precedent.15  Part IV.C discusses the issue of offensive collateral 
estoppel, which was central to Hankerson but was not discussed by 
either the majority or the dissent.16  Finally, Part IV.D addresses a 
major issue that Hankerson left unresolved: whether double 
jeopardy can ever apply to aggravating factors.17
II. BACKGROUND: JURY REVIEW AND DOUBLE JEOPARDY 
A. Right to Jury Review 
1. Jury with a Capital J, or “Today You Are the Law”18
The right to a jury trial is firmly rooted in America’s common-
law heritage.19  Blackstone put it elegantly, stating: 
 10. See infra Part II. 
 11. See infra Part II.A. 
 12. See infra Part II.B. 
 13. See infra Part III. 
 14. See infra Part IV. 
 15. See infra Part IV.B. 
 16. See infra Part IV.C. 
 17. See infra Part IV.D. 
 18. THE VERDICT (Twentieth-Century Fox 1982).  The quotation is from Frank 
Galvin’s (Paul Newman) summation. 
 19. See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES *278, *342–44. 
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[liberty is only secure] so long as this palladium remains 
sacred and inviolate, not only from all open attacks . . . 
but also from all secret machinations, which may sap and 
undermine it; by introducing new and arbitrary methods 
of trial.  And however convenient these may appear at 
first, (as doubtless all arbitrary powers, well executed, are 
the most convenient), yet let it be again remembered, that 
delays, and little inconveniences in the forms of justice, 
are the price that all free nations must pay for their liberty 
in more substantial matters.20
The Framers’ concern with jury trial rights was so strong that 
they highlighted it in the Declaration of Independence: “For 
depriving us, in many Cases, of the benefits of a Trial by Jury.”21  
Revolutionary Americans had real reason to give the jury a starring 
role in the Declaration of Independence: Parliament barred the 
right to a jury trial for violations of the Stamp Act.22  The debate 
between Anti-Federalists and Federalists as to whether Article III of 
the proposed constitution sufficiently protected the jury-trial right 
further illustrates that the Framers considered the jury right 
centrally important.23  Of course, the first Congress ultimately 
resolved the debate with the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh 
Amendments.24
It is important to recognize that the jury’s power has changed 
considerably throughout American history.  For example, jury 
power was at its apogee in eighteenth-century and early nineteenth-
century America when juries decided matters of law.25  In other 
 20. Id. 
 21. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 20 (U.S. 1776). 
 22. CARL UBBELOHDE, THE VICE-ADMIRALTY COURTS AND THE AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION 76–77 (1960). 
 23. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION 234 (2005). 
 24. Id. at 237. 
 25. Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 163 (1895) (Gray, J., dissenting); 
Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 U.S. 1, 4 (1794).  In Sparf, Justice Gray noted: 
In 1815, at the trial of John Hodges, in the circuit court of the United 
States for the district of Maryland, for treason, William Pinkney, for the 
defendant, argued: ‘The best security for the rights of individuals is to be 
found in the trial by jury.  But the excellence of this institution consists in 
its exclusive power.  The jury are here judges of law and fact, and are 
responsible only to God, to the prisoner, and to their own consciences.’  
And Mr. Justice Duvall, of this [C]ourt, after expressing his opinion upon 
the law of the case, said, with the concurrence of Judge Houston: ‘The 
jury are not bound to conform to this opinion, because they have a right, 
in all criminal cases, to decide on the law and the facts.’ 
Sparf, 156 U.S. at 163 (Gray, J., dissenting). 
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words, “jury review today is just a shadow of what it was to” the 
Framers.26  Cast in this light, the modern Court’s extension of jury 
review in Apprendi, Ring, and Blakely is, perhaps, less astonishing 
than first impression suggests. 
2. The Blakely Line 
Like Hankerson, Monge v. California27 involved double jeopardy, 
but it also augured Apprendi and Blakely.28  In Monge, the defendant 
was convicted of drug possession and transportation with an 
aggravating factor.29  On appeal, the State conceded that its 
evidence of the aggravating factor (that Monge had “personally 
used a stick” in a prior felony) was insufficient and requested 
another opportunity to prove the aggravating factor.30  The 
Supreme Court held that double jeopardy did not apply to 
sentencing proceedings and findings of aggravating factors.31
Justice Scalia’s dissent in Monge argued that the aggravating 
factor was functionally the same as an element of an offense.32  So 
the appellate court’s holding of insufficient evidence was an 
acquittal, and thus, double jeopardy barred the second 
prosecution.33  Justice Scalia argued that allowing the legislature to 
label a factual finding a sentence enhancement versus an element 
of a crime “eviscerate[d] the Double Jeopardy Clause” and could 
be used to dispense the “inconvenient constitutional” right to a 
jury.34  Apprendi and its progeny vindicated Scalia’s dissent. 
Jones v. United States35 followed the Monge dissent.  In Jones, the 
Court addressed whether the federal car-jacking statute defined 
three separate offenses or a single offense with three possible 
sentences.36  The Court concluded that the statute defined three 
 26. AMAR, supra note 23, at 242. 
 27. 524 U.S. 721 (1998). 
 28. See id. at 740 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 29. Id. at 724 (majority opinion). 
 30. Id. at 725–26. 
 31. Id. at 730.  But the Supreme Court previously held that double jeopardy 
applies when sentencing proceedings have “the hallmarks of [a] trial.”  Id. at 726 
(citing Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 439 (1981)).  The Monge Court argued 
that Bullington was a rare exception because it involved a capital sentence.  Id. at 
730. 
 32. Id. at 741 n.2 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 33. Id. at 741. 
 34. Id. at 740. 
 35. 526 U.S. 227 (1999). 
 36. Id. at 229. 
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separate offenses.37  Although the Court partially relied on statutory 
construction and comparison with similar statutes, the Court’s 
conclusion turned on judicial economy.38  The Court wanted to 
avoid the constitutional issue of whether a judge may find 
aggravating factors that determine the maximum possible 
sentence.39
The Jones dissent, however, argued that judicial findings of 
aggravating factors do not raise Sixth Amendment issues.40  
Responding to the Jones dissent, the majority defined the 
constitutional concern: “[T]he required procedures for finding the 
facts that determine the maximum permissible punishment; these 
are the safeguards going to the formality of notice, the identity of 
the fact finder, and the burden of proof.”41  Specifically, the Jones 
majority cited the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, and the 
Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of notice and a right to a jury trial.42  
Apprendi’s and Blakely’s roots lie in Jones’s five to four avoidance 
decision. 
If Jones, as the dissent rightly argued, cast doubt on the 
constitutionality of sentencing guidelines, Apprendi directly 
challenged them.43  In Apprendi, the defendant pled guilty to two 
counts of second-degree firearm possession for an unlawful 
purpose and one count of third-degree unlawful possession of an 
antipersonnel bomb.44  The firearm possession offense carried a 
maximum penalty of ten years of imprisonment.45  But New Jersey’s 
hate-crime law allowed a term of ten to twenty years when a second-
degree offense was “with a purpose to intimidate an individual . . . 
because of race.”46  The trial judge determined that defendant 
Apprendi’s crime was racially motivated and departed from the ten-
year maximum, imposing a twelve-year term.47  The oft-cited 
holding from Apprendi is: “Other than the fact of a prior conviction, 
any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the 
 37. Id. at 251–52. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 248. 
 40. Id. at 268 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 41. Id. at 243 n.6 (majority opinion). 
 42. Id. 
 43. See id. at 254 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 44. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 469–70 (2000). 
 45. Id. at 468. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 471. 
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prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury.”48  
Accordingly, the trial judge’s finding of race-based motivation was 
unconstitutional judicial fact finding.49  If a judicially found 
“sentencing enhancement” increases the statutory maximum 
penalty, then it functions as an element of an offense and must be 
found by a jury regardless of legislative labeling.50
Ring v. Arizona51 reaffirmed Apprendi in the context of a death 
penalty case.52  Under Arizona law, following a jury’s guilty verdict 
for first-degree murder, a trial judge determined the presence or 
absence of the aggravating factors necessary to impose the death 
penalty.53  A jury convicted Ring of felony murder for his 
participation in a robbery of an armored truck and the resulting 
murder of the truck’s driver.54  The trial judge in Ring found the 
requisite aggravating factors.55  The Ring Court held that “[i]f a 
State makes an increase in a defendant’s authorized punishment 
 48. Id. at 525 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).  See, e.g., People v. Cardenas, 66 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 821, 828 (Ct. App. 2007); State v. Robinson, 937 A.2d 717, 719 n.7 (Conn. 
App. Ct. 2008); Abrams v. State, 971 So. 2d 1033, 1035–36 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2008); State v. Lowden, 174 P.3d 895, 896 (Kan. Ct. App. 2008); Spears v. State, 
724 N.W.2d 696, 698 (Minn. 2006); State v. Read, 938 A.2d 953, 960 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 2008); State v. Wissink, 652 S.E.2d 17, 19 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007). 
 49. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 491–92. 
 50. Id. at 494 (“[T]he relevant inquiry is one not of form, but of effect.”). 
 51. 536 U.S. 584 (2002). 
 52. Id. at 588.  See also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-1105(A), (B) (2001). 
 53. Ring, 536 U.S. at 592. 
 54. Id. at 591.  Note that under Arizona law, felony murder does not require 
that a defendant have actually killed someone.  Id. 
 55. Id. at 594.  Ring exemplifies the policy that underpins Apprendi and 
Blakely.  In Ring, the trial judge determined whether Ring shot and killed a person 
and whether any aggravating factors were present.  Id. at 594–95.  The judge’s 
findings of these facts allowed for Ring’s execution.  Id.  The judge partially based 
his findings on the testimony of Ring’s accomplice, Greenham.  Id.  Greenham 
testified after making a deal with the prosecution that limited his sentence to a 
330-month term of imprisonment.  Id. at 593.  The judge concluded from 
Greenham’s testimony that Ring shot the driver, and did so in an “especially 
heinous, cruel, or depraved manner.”  Id. at 593–94.  But Greenham also admitted 
that part of his testimony contradicted statements that he had previously made to 
Ring’s attorney.  Id. at 594.  Moreover, Greenham admitted that he testified as 
“pay back” for threats that Ring had made, and for Ring’s interference with the 
relationship between Greenham and Greenham’s ex-wife.  Id. 
  Certainly, determining whether Greenham was a credible witness 
required judgment of debatable fact, the result of which meant Ring’s life or 
death.  See id. at 593–96.  If Arizona law had been written differently, defining the 
aggravating factors as elements of the offense rather than as an aggravating factor, 
then Ring would have had a constitutional right to have a jury make this 
judgment.  Id. at 604–05.  By labeling the fact an aggravating factor, the Arizona 
legislature denied Ring this constitutional right.  See id. at 609. 
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contingent on the finding of a fact, that fact—no matter how the 
State labels it—must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable 
doubt.”56
But both Apprendi and Ring left unclear exactly what qualified 
as the statutory maximum in a mandatory sentencing guidelines 
system.57  For example, suppose that drug possession carries a 
statutory sentence of ten to twenty years.  But for a particular 
defendant, with a particular criminal history, mandatory sentencing 
guidelines require a range of ten to fifteen years.  Is the statutory 
maximum for Apprendi purposes the twenty years defined in the 
statute, or the fifteen-year guideline sentence that the judge is 
statutorily required to follow?  Blakely answered: “[T]he ‘statutory 
maximum’ for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge 
may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury 
verdict or admitted by the defendant.”58
3. Apprendi in Minnesota 
Next consider how Apprendi and Blakely affected Minnesota 
law.  The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines are a determinate 
system enacted to ensure uniform and fair sentences.59  The 
Guidelines operate like a two-variable equation: the judge plugs in 
the offense level and defendant’s criminal history, and the 
Guidelines yield a presumptive sentence range.60  The district court 
has discretion to depart from the presumptive range “only if 
aggravating or mitigating circumstances are present.”61
On June 2, 2005, the Minnesota legislature amended 
Minnesota Statutes section 244.10 subdivision 5(a), and the 
sentencing guidelines, in order to make Minnesota’s guideline 
scheme constitutional in light of Blakely.62  But before the 2005 
amendments to section 244.10 and the sentencing guidelines, 
judges found aggravating factors.63  As amended, section 244.10 
 56. Id. at 602. 
 57. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 304–06 (2004). 
 58. Id. at 303. 
 59. MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES I (2006). 
 60. See State v. Shattuck, 704 N.W.2d 131, 139 (Minn. 2005). 
 61. State v. Best, 449 N.W.2d 426, 427 (Minn. 1989).  See MINN. SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES II.D. 
 62. Hankerson v. State, 723 N.W.2d 232, 234–35 (Minn. 2006). 
 63. MINN. STAT. § 244.10, subdiv. 2 (2004) (“[T]he district court shall make 
findings of fact [justifying] the reasons for departure from the Sentencing 
Guidelines . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
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subdivision 5(a) requires that a jury find aggravating factors and 
stipulates that the jury requirement applies to resentencing 
hearings.64  The sentencing guidelines also stipulate that a jury find 
aggravating factors, but the amended Guidelines became effective 
June 3, 2007 and did not mention resentencing.65
In State v. Shattuck,66 the Minnesota Supreme Court held that 
the pre-2005 sentencing guidelines were unconstitutional because 
they allowed upward departures from presumptive sentences based 
on judicial fact-finding.67  The Shattuck court, however, stated that 
the unconstitutional portion could be severed from the otherwise 
constitutional portion of the guidelines.68  The judicially modified 
statutes were short lived because the Minnesota Legislature 
corrected the problem with the 2005 amendments, which were 
enacted just as the court decided Shattuck.69  Finally, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court held that Blakely applies retrospectively to only 
those cases pending on direct review when Blakely was decided.70
B. Double Jeopardy 
1. A Brief History 
Although the precise origins of double jeopardy are unclear, 
its historical roots certainly run deep.71  For example, ancient 
Jewish law proscribed double jeopardy.72  Greek and Roman 
 64. MINN. STAT. § 244.10, subdiv. (5)(a) (2006). 
 65. See MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES II.D (affording the accused a right to a 
jury trial in determining whether the facts support a sentencing departure, but not 
mentioning resentencing in this section, or in any other section of the 
Guidelines). 
 66. 704 N.W.2d 131 (Minn. 2005). 
 67. Id. at 141–42. 
 68. Id. at 144; cf. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 246–47 (2005) 
(severing the mandatory provisions from the federal sentencing guidelines and 
thus rendering them advisory and constitutional). 
 69. Shattuck, 704 N.W.2d at 148 n.17. 
 70. State v. Houston, 702 N.W.2d 268, 270–73 (Minn. 2005).  The court also 
held that a trial court had the inherent power to impanel a jury to decide 
aggravating factors and that the failure to include averments of aggravating factors 
in the complaint does not violate Sixth Amendment or Fourteenth Amendment 
rights.  State v. Chauvin, 723 N.W.2d 20, 29–30 (Minn. 2006). 
 71. See David S. Rudstein, A Brief History of the Fifth Amendment Guarantee 
Against Double Jeopardy, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 193, 196–97 (2005) (tracing the 
origins of double jeopardy). 
 72. See id. at 197 (quoting BABYLONIAN TALMUD, KETHUBOTH 32b (Isidore 
Epstein ed., Samuel Daiches trans., 1936)). 
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jurisprudence also prohibited double jeopardy.73  Referring to the 
Greek double-jeopardy prohibition, one commentator wrote: 
“[O]nce tried he could not be prosecuted again on the same 
charge, the rule ne bis in eadem re being accepted in Athens if not in 
Sparta.”74  The Romans similarly protected against double 
jeopardy—nemo debet bis puniri pro uno delicto.75  The Roman 
prohibition against double jeopardy was, however, of a different 
color than the modern prohibition.76  For example, one Roman 
jurist stated that double jeopardy only barred a second prosecution 
after thirty days elapsed from the time of an acquittal.77
Double jeopardy also traces back into English common law at 
least as far as the thirteenth century.78  The common-law roots of 
double jeopardy commonly cited are the four pleas of autrefois 
acquit, autrefois convict, autrefois attaint, and former pardon.79  Double 
jeopardy first appeared in North America in 1641, in the 
Massachusetts Bay Colony’s “Body of Liberties.”80  Of course, after 
the Revolution, the unamended Constitution contained no double-
jeopardy protection.  But on June 8, 1789 James Madison proposed 
amending the Constitution to add, inter alia, the protection that 
“[n]o person shall be subject, except in cases of impeachment, to 
more than one punishment or one trial for the same offense.”81  
Notwithstanding the importance of double-jeopardy history, its 
 73. See id. at 198.  Justice Black stressed double jeopardy’s historical pedigree: 
“Even in the Dark Ages, when so many other principles of justice were lost, the 
idea that one trial and one punishment were enough remained alive . . . .”  
Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 152 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting). 
 74. Rudstein, supra note 71, at 198–99 (quoting J. WALTER JONES, THE LAW AND 
LEGAL THEORY OF THE GREEKS: AN INTRODUCTION 149 (1956)). 
 75. Id. at 198 (quoting JAY J. SIGLER, DOUBLE JEOPARDY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF A 
LEGAL AND SOCIAL POLICY 2 (1969)).  Nemo debet bis puniri pro uno delicto means “no 
one ought to be punished for the same offense.”  BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1736 
(8th ed. 2004).
 76. See Rudstein, supra note 71, at 199 (describing the limited protection 
offered against double jeopardy in Roman law). 
 77. See id. (citing The Opinions of Paulus 4.17, in 1 THE CIVIL LAW 323 (S.P. 
Scott trans., 1973)). 
 78. Id. at 202. 
 79. Anne Bowen Poulin, Double Jeopardy Protection from Successive Prosecution: A 
Proposed Approach, 92 GEO. L.J. 1183, 1197 (2004). 
 80. Rudstein, supra note 71, at 221–22.  The Massachusetts Body of Liberties 
has been declared the “most important . . . forerunner of the Bill of Rights.”  Id. at 
222 (quoting 1 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 
69 (1971)). 
 81. Id. at 227 (quoting 1 ANALS OF CONG. 257, 451–52 (Joseph Gales ed., 
1834)). 
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complete discussion is beyond the scope of this note and would 
only duplicate the efforts of other commentators.82
The Double Jeopardy Clause states “nor shall any person be 
subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or 
limb.”83  This seemingly simple sentence has been the source of an 
endless line of Supreme Court cases.  It is convenient to break the 
clause into three elements: (1) jeopardy of life and limb; (2) twice 
put in jeopardy; and (3) same offense.84
2. “Life or Limb”85
The Court interpreted the life or limb element in Ex parte 
Lange,86 the holding of which has remained intact since 1873.87  The 
Court’s interpretation of the other two double-jeopardy elements 
has not been so stable: in the last thirty years the Court has 
overturned two lines of cases interpreting the twice put in jeopardy 
and same offense elements.88
In Lange, Lange was convicted of stealing Post Office mail 
bags.89  The trial judge mistakenly imposed a one-year prison 
sentence and a one-hundred dollar fine when only one or the 
other was allowed.90  On a writ of habeas corpus the same trial 
 82. See generally JAY J. SIGLER, DOUBLE JEOPARDY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF A LEGAL 
AND SOCIAL POLICY (1969); GEORGE C. THOMAS III, DOUBLE JEOPARDY: THE HISTORY, 
THE LAW (1998); Rudstein, supra note 71.  Historical perspectives may provide little 
guidance in resolving modern double-jeopardy issues.  Poulin, supra note 79, at 
1197 (pointing out, inter alia, that Justices Scalia and Brennan have employed 
historical arguments to arrive at opposite conclusions). 
 83. U.S. CONST. amend. V.  The Double Jeopardy Clause applies to states 
courtesy of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.  Benton v. 
Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969).  As Blakely also indicated, the Double 
Jeopardy Clause protects jury review.  AMAR, supra note 23, at 330 (pointing out 
that double jeopardy functions to make a jury’s acquittal irreversible).  Double 
jeopardy applies in three circumstances: (1) a second prosecution for the same 
offense after an acquittal; (2) a second prosecution for the same offense after a 
conviction; and (3) multiple punishments for the same offense.  North Carolina v. 
Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 719 (1969). 
 84. See Akhil Reed Amar, Double Jeopardy Law Made Simple, 106 YALE L.J. 1807, 
1809 (1997) . 
 85. U.S. CONST. amend V. 
 86. 85 U.S. 163 (1873). 
 87. See Stephen N. Limbaugh, The Case of Ex Parte Lange (or How the Double 
Jeopardy Lost Its “Life or Limb”), 36 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 53, 55 (1999). 
 88. United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 704 (1993); Burks v. United States, 
437 U.S. 1, 18 (1978). 
 89. Lange, 85 U.S. at 164. 
 90. Id. 
11
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judge vacated the original judgment and imposed a one-year prison 
term without a fine.91  The judge did not order the refund of 
Lange’s one-hundred dollars.92  The Supreme Court vacated 
Lange’s sentence based on double jeopardy.93  The effect of Lange, 
in which only a misdemeanor charge was at issue, is that a 
defendant’s “life or limb” is now implicitly in jeopardy in all 
criminal cases.94  Lange is, as one commentary puts it, the story of 
how the Double Jeopardy Clause “[l]ost [i]ts life or [l]imb.”95
3. “Twice Put in Jeopardy”96
The line of cases interpreting twice put in jeopardy begins with 
United States v. Ball.97  When analyzing the “twice put in jeopardy” 
element, there are two questions to consider: when does jeopardy 
begin (attach) and when does jeopardy end (terminate)?  Jeopardy 
attaches when the jury is impaneled.98  Ball makes another situation 
clear: a fact finder’s acquittal terminates defendant’s jeopardy.99  In 
Ball, three defendants were indicted for murder.100  The defendants 
were charged with shooting a Native American.101  A jury convicted 
two of the defendants and acquitted the third.102  The Supreme 
Court eventually overturned the convictions because the 
indictment failed to aver that the victim died from the gunshot 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id.  The Lange dissent criticized the majority for its blatant breach of 
judicial economy; the Court decided the constitutional double-jeopardy issue 
rather than avoiding it by ordering a refund and credit for time served.  Id. at 184–
87 (Clifford, J., dissenting). 
 94. See id. at 170–71 (majority opinion).  The Lange Court justified its non-
formalist interpretation of the life or limb element mainly by pointing out that 
individual rights were at stake:  
There is no more sacred duty of a court than . . . to maintain . . . the 
personal rights of the individual . . . ; and in such cases no narrow or 
illiberal construction should be given to the words of the fundamental 
law in which they are embodied.   
Id. at 178. 
 95. See Limbaugh, supra note 87. 
 96. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 97. 163 U.S. 662 (1896). 
 98. Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 38 (1978). 
 99. Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141, 143 (1962) (district judge’s 
erroneous acquittal barred second prosecution); Ball, 163 U.S. at 671 (jury’s 
acquittal barred second prosecution). 
 100. Ball, 163 U.S. at 663. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 664. 
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wound within a year and a day from being shot.103  The Supreme 
Court remanded the case to the circuit court.104  A second grand 
jury indicted all three defendants, and all three pled double 
jeopardy.105  The circuit court rejected the double-jeopardy defense, 
and the second jury convicted all three defendants.106
Unequivocally, the Ball court held that double jeopardy barred 
retrying the acquitted defendant: “[I]n this country a verdict of 
acquittal, although not followed by any judgment, is a bar to a 
subsequent prosecution for the same offense.”107  But double 
jeopardy permitted the retrial of the two defendants who were 
previously convicted: “[A] defendant who procures a judgment 
against him upon an indictment to be set aside may be tried anew 
upon the same indictment.”108
In Bryan v. United States,109 the Court decided whether double 
jeopardy barred retrial after an appellate court’s reversal of a 
district judge’s erroneous denial of defendant’s motion to acquit 
for insufficient evidence.110  The Bryan court held that double 
jeopardy did not bar a second trial.111  The Court invoked the 
waiver rule,112 which provides that a defendant waives his right to a 
double-jeopardy defense by requesting a new trial following the 
reversal of a conviction on appeal.113  The Bryan rule yielded 
anomalous results: double jeopardy barred a second prosecution if 
the district judge correctly acquitted for insufficient evidence, but 
double jeopardy did not bar a second trial if the district judge 
incorrectly submitted the question to a jury and an appellate court 
later reversed.114  In Burks v. United States,115 the Court concluded 
 103. Causation required, evidently, that the victim dies within a year and a day 
after being assaulted by defendant.  The second indictment read: “T. Box[, the 
victim,] did languish, and languishing did then and there instantly die, and did 
then and there die within a year and a day after the infliction of the said mortal 
wounds as aforesaid.”  Id. at 665.  The second time the grand jury took no chances: 
dying instantly from an injury meant dying within a year and a day from an injury. 
 104. Id. at 664. 
 105. Id. at 665. 
 106. Id. at 665–66. 
 107. Id. at 671. 
 108. Id. at 672. 
 109. 338 U.S. 552 (1950). 
 110. Id. at 560. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Sumpter v. DeGroote, 552 F.2d 1206, 1210 n.14 (7th Cir. 1977). 
 114. Compare Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141 (1962) (holding that 
acquittal by district judge for insufficient evidence, even though potentially 
13
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that this distinction was “purely arbitrary.”116  Burks overruled Bryan, 
holding that double jeopardy bars retrial when an appellate court 
finds that a trial judge should have acquitted because of insufficient 
evidence.117
An important aspect of Burks was its explicit rejection of the 
abstract double-jeopardy theories (such as waiver and continuing 
jeopardy)118 in favor of the policy-balancing test in United States v. 
Tateo.119  The Tateo court stressed that policy controls double-
jeopardy analysis.120  The analysis balances “the defendant’s interest 
in repose and society’s interest in the orderly administration of 
justice.”121  Double jeopardy should protect against wearing down 
an innocent defendant with repeated prosecution122 and from the 
prosecution “honing its trial strategies” through successive 
prosecution.123
But courts often point out that double-jeopardy immunity can 
disserve defendants because appellate courts would be less likely to 
erroneous, barred a second trial), with Bryan, 338 U.S. at 560.  Indeed the Court 
and the circuits struggled with Bryan.  See Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 328 
(1957); Sapir v. United States, 348 U.S. 373, 374 (1955); Sumpter, 552 F.2d at 1211 
(stating that the Ball  rule “operates in practice as an engine of inequity when 
applied in cases such as Bryan”); United States v. DiSilvio, 520 F.2d 247, 249 n.3 
(3d Cir. 1975) (refusing to follow Bryan). 
  In the Bryan line of cases, the Court seemed to make a hyper-technical 
distinction.  See Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 11 (1978).  Double jeopardy 
bars retrial when an appellate court orders a judgment of acquittal and defendant 
did not ask for a new trial, but if defendant asks for a new trial (even in the 
alternative) defendant waives his or her claim to a double-jeopardy defense.  Sapir, 
348 U.S. at 374.  The Bryan line typifies what happens when courts uncritically rely 
on “wholly fictional” theories of double jeopardy such as termination of  jeopardy, 
continuing jeopardy, or waiver of jeopardy.  See Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 
184, 192 (1957). 
 115. 437 U.S. 1 (1978). 
 116. Id. at 11. 
 117. Id. at 17–18. 
 118. According to the continuing jeopardy and termination of jeopardy 
theories, jeopardy does not terminate until after defendant is acquitted or until 
defendant’s appeal clock has run.  Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 134 
(1904).  Justice Holmes advanced the continuing jeopardy theory in Kepner.  Id. at 
134–37.  It has been evoked in recent Supreme Court decisions.  Sattazahn v. 
Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 109 (2003); Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33, 40 
(1988). 
 119. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 466 (1964), cited in Burks, 437 U.S. at 15 n.9.  See also 
Green, 355 U.S at 192. 
 120. Tateo, 377 U.S. at 466. 
 121. Lockhart, 488 U.S. at 48 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 122. Green, 355 U.S. at 187. 
 123. Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 41 (1982); Amar, supra note 84, at 1822. 
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overturn trial court decisions if reversal resulted in immunity from 
further prosecution.124  Commentators and courts have thus argued 
that these interests control double-jeopardy considerations.125  The 
point to keep in mind when considering the Minnesota Supreme 
Court’s decision in Hankerson is that mechanically applying 
“conceptual abstractions,”126 such as termination of or continuing 
jeopardy, is a slippery business.127
Specifically, the Hankerson majority relied on two post-Burks 
decisions that used the continuation of jeopardy theory, Sattazahn 
v. Pennsylvania128 and Lockhart v. Nelson.129  In Sattazahn, the jury 
deadlocked as to whether an aggravating factor was present.130  In 
the absence of an aggravating factor, the court was forced to 
sentence the defendant to life imprisonment rather than impose 
the death penalty.131  After the defendant’s conviction was 
overturned, a second jury found the aggravating factor after retrial, 
and the defendant was sentenced to death.132  The death sentence 
was not barred by double jeopardy because absent an acquittal of the 
aggravating factor, jeopardy had not terminated.133
In Lockhart, the defendant received an enhanced sentence 
because of four prior convictions, but the defendant had actually 
been pardoned of one.134  Three years after conviction, a federal 
court “declared the enhanced sentence to be invalid.”135  The State 
intended to resentence Lockhart based on another prior 
 124. Tateo, 377 U.S. at 466. 
 125. “[O]f greater importance than the conceptual abstractions employed to 
explain the Ball principle are the implications of that principle for the sound 
administration of Justice.”  Id.  Even when the Supreme Court has heavily relied 
on the termination of jeopardy “conceptual abstraction,” the Court has admitted 
that “the continuing jeopardy principle appears to rest on an amalgam of 
interests—e.g., fairness to society, lack of finality, and limited waiver, among 
others.”  Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 329 n.4 (1970).  See also Rudstein, supra 
note 71, at 195. 
 126. Tateo, 377 U.S. at 466. 
 127. See, e.g., Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 11 (1950) (explaining that a 
different result in the application of the double-jeopardy doctrine would occur, 
depending upon the level at which an error at trial was discovered). 
 128. 537 U.S. 101, 109 (2003). 
 129. 488 U.S. 33, 48 (1988). 
 130. Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 104. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 105. 
 133. Id. at 109. 
 134. Lockhart, 488 U.S. at 36. 
 135. Id. at 37. 
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conviction.136  The Supreme Court held that double jeopardy did 
not bar resentencing since the defendant’s “conviction [was] 
reversed because evidence was erroneously admitted against him,” 
not because of insufficient evidence.137  Thus, there was no acquittal 
and no termination of jeopardy.138  Note the inconsistent use of 
terms in Lockhart: “enhanced sentence” versus “conviction.”  The 
same semantic inconsistency arises in Hankerson.139
To summarize, under the current “twice put in jeopardy” law, 
retrial of a defendant is barred by double jeopardy: (1) after an 
acquittal by a fact finder;140 (2) after an appellate court’s holding 
that a trial court should have acquitted because of insufficient 
evidence;141 and (3) while defendant remains convicted of the same 
offense.142  Double jeopardy does not bar successive prosecution 
when: (1) an appellate court overturns a conviction because it is 
against the weight of the evidence;143 (2) a jury deadlocks as to a 
particular offense or element of an offense; or  (3) a conviction is 
overturned based on a legal error.144  Finally, double jeopardy does 
not necessarily bar the imposition of a sentence on retrial that is 
more severe than the sentence that was imposed for the first, 
overturned conviction.145
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 40. 
 138. Id. 
 139. See infra Part IV.A. 
 140. Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141, 143 (1962); Ball v. United States, 
163 U.S. 662, 671 (1896).  Also, the conviction of a lesser included offense acts as 
an implied acquittal of the greater offense where: (1) a fact finder is authorized to 
find a defendant guilty of either a greater offense or the lesser included; (2) the 
fact finder finds the defendant guilty of the lesser included; and (3) the fact finder 
is silent on the greater offense.  Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 190 (1957).  
In such cases double jeopardy may bar retrial of the greater offense after the lesser 
offense conviction is overturned.  Id. 
 141. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1978). 
 142. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 169 (1977) (“[T]he Fifth Amendment 
forbids successive prosecution . . . for a greater and lesser included offense.”).  
This rule may be subject to a major exception when an appellate court allows a 
trial court to retain and retry.  See Bell v. State, 292 S.E.2d 402, 404 (Ga. 1982); 
infra Part IV.A. 
 143. Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 42 (1982). 
 144. Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 109 (2003). 
 145. Stroud v. United States, 251 U.S. 15, 18 (1919) (holding that the 
defendant’s overturned murder conviction and life-imprisonment sentence did 
not bar a second conviction and a death sentence).  Contrast Stroud with 
Minnesota law, which holds that a court cannot sentence a defendant who has 
obtained a new trial to a punishment “more onerous” than the first sentence.  
State v. Holmes, 281 Minn. 294, 296, 161 N.W.2d 650, 652 (Minn. 1968). 
16
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4. “Same Offence”146
The Double Jeopardy Clause’s first element is the touchstone 
of double-jeopardy analysis: whether offenses are the “same 
offense.”  Blockburger v. United States147 provided a simple rule.148  In a 
terse four page opinion that would eventually dominate double-
jeopardy jurisprudence, the Court held that two offenses are the 
same offense unless each has an element that the other does not.149
In Grady v. Corbin,150 a five-to-four majority held that the 
definition of “same offense” was different depending on whether 
double jeopardy protected from successive prosecutions or 
cumulative punishment.151  According to Grady, in the case of 
successive prosecutions, two offenses are the same if the second 
offense contains one element of the first offense for which the state 
has already obtained a conviction.152  Eventually, the Grady dissent 
prevailed.  In United States v. Dixon,153 the Court overruled Grady in 
holding that the Blockburger test was the sole test for determining 
whether offenses are the same offense.154  One effect of Blockburger 
 146. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 147. 284 U.S. 299 (1932). 
 148. Id. at 304. 
 149. Id. 
 150. 495 U.S. 508 (1990). 
 151. Id. at 516. 
 152. Id. 
 153. 509 U.S. 688 (1993). 
 154. Id. at 703–04.  Note that numerous commentators have criticized the use 
of the Blockburger test as the sole same-offense test for all double jeopardy 
questions.  Amar, supra note 84; Poulin, supra note 79.  Professor Amar argues that 
the Blockburger test both under-protects and overprotects defendants from double 
jeopardy.  Amar, supra note 84, at 1818–19.  Under Professor Amar’s suggested 
definition, same offense means literally identical offense, i.e., violation of the same 
statute based on the same conduct.  Id. at 1814–15 (“Same means same; and done 
is done—this is the obvious meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause.”).  The 
procedural protections that a defendant loses when a court adopts this narrow 
definition of same offense are made up for by Amar’s broad interpretation of the 
Due Process Clause.  Id. at 1816. 
  Professor Poulin criticizes Dixon for adopting a one-size-fits-all holding 
when a more flexible approach is needed.  Poulin, supra note 79, at 1214–18.  
Blockburger, Poulin argues, addressed the question of cumulative punishment, not 
successive prosecutions.  See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 303–04 
(1932).  In Blockburger, the defendant was convicted of selling prescription drugs 
after removing the drugs from their “original stamped package” and of selling 
prescription drugs to someone without a prescription.  Id. 
  The question in Blockburger (like the question in all cases involving 
cumulative sentencing of offenses that arise out of the same transaction) was then 
one of legislative intent: did Congress intend the offenses to be stacked or was one 
17
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is to bar prosecution of a greater offense after a defendant has 
been convicted of the lesser included offense.155
III. THE HANKERSON DECISION 
A. Statement of the Case and Facts 
In September 2002, after deliberating for eight hours, a jury 
convicted Dena Lyn Hankerson of first-degree criminal sexual 
conduct, burglary, and making terroristic threats.156  Hankerson, a 
thirty-two-year old mother of two, knocked on the door of a home 
and found a twelve-year old girl babysitting two young children.157  
Hankerson left, but returned moments later to rape the twelve-year 
old girl.158  According to news reports, Hankerson tried to get the 
victim to use drugs and offered to pay her for sex.159  During the 
sexual assault, Hankerson punched the victim in the face, 
threatened to kill her, and threatened to kill the children in the 
victim’s charge.160  Hankerson stopped assaulting the victim only 
when the three-year old, whom the victim was babysitting, entered 
the room in which Hankerson was raping the girl.161
to supplant the other?  Poulin, supra note 79, at 1206.  Professor Poulin argues 
that Congress, after all, has authority to define whatever sentence it wishes so long 
as the defendant receives due process and the Eighth Amendment is satisfied.  Id.  
Where the legislature intends that offenses arising out of the same transaction be 
punished separately, cumulative punishment does not offend double jeopardy.  
Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 368–69 (1983). 
  Accordingly, Blockburger merely provides a default test with which to gauge 
whether the legislature intended cumulative punishment where the legislature did 
not explicitly state its intent.  Poulin, supra note 79, at 1206.  Thus, applying the 
Blockburger test in cases of successive prosecution is a story of square peg meets 
round hole that ends in under-protecting defendants from double jeopardy.  Id. at 
1208.  Instead, Professor Poulin recommends, for cases of successive prosecutions, 
a broad transactional definition of same offense, counterweighted by the state’s 
legitimate interests in successive prosecution.  Id. at 1258–86.  In other words, 
double jeopardy bars successive prosecution of offenses arising out of the same 
transaction, unless the state has a legitimate reason for the successive 
prosecutions.  Id. 
 155. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 166 (1977). 
 156. Hankerson v. State, 723 N.W.2d 232, 234 (Minn. 2006); Bob Burroughs, 
Judge Throws Book at Woman, RED WING REPUBLICAN EAGLE, Dec. 21, 2002, at 1. 
 157. Jen Cullen, Jury: Rape Warrants Longer Sentence, RED WING REPUBLICAN 
EAGLE, Aug. 25, 2007, at 1A. 
 158. Id. at 6A. 
 159. Burroughs, supra note 156, at 1. 
 160. Hankerson, 723 N.W.2d at 234. 
 161. Burroughs, supra note 156, at 15. 
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The victim’s mother addressed the district court during the 
sentencing phase and explained the horrible effects of the assault 
on the victim.162  The mother asked that the judge impose the 
“largest sentence possible by law” on Hankerson.163  The trial judge 
found four aggravating factors: (1) particularly cruel offense; (2) 
particularly vulnerable victim; (3) multiple acts of penetration; and 
(4) terroristic threats.164  Accordingly, the judge imposed a sentence 
with “a 120-month upward departure from the 144-month 
presumptive sentence.”165  Hankerson appealed from the 
sentence.166  The court of appeals affirmed the criminal sexual 
conduct and burglary convictions but reversed the terroristic threat 
conviction since the terroristic threats “arose out of a single 
behavioral incident,” the sex crime.167  On June 15, 2004, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court denied review of the appellate court’s 
decision.168
Nine days later the United States Supreme Court decided 
Blakely.169  Blakely applied retrospectively because Hankerson’s time 
to petition the Supreme Court had not expired.170  Hankerson 
petitioned a post-conviction court for relief, asserting that the 
presumptive sentence should be substituted for the original 
sentence.171  The post-conviction court denied the request and 
scheduled a jury trial to resentence Hankerson.172  Hankerson 
appealed, and the Minnesota Supreme Court granted an 
accelerated review.173
 162. Id. at 1. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Hankerson, 723 N.W.2d at 237. 
 165. Id. at 234. 
 166. State v. Hankerson, No. A03-131, 2004 WL 771304, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. 
Apr. 13, 2004). 
 167. Id. at *3. 
 168. Hankerson, 723 N.W.2d at 234. 
 169. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 296 (2004). 
 170. Hankerson, 723 N.W.2d at 234 n.1. 
 171. Id. at 235. 
 172. Id.  Strangely, the post-conviction court denied Hankerson’s request to 
vacate her sentence.  Id. at 239 n.4.  Presumably, the court recognized that the 
sentence was “defective” and would have vacated it at some point before 
resentencing.  Id.  Justice Page considered the original sentence illegal.  Id. at 244 
(Page, J., dissenting). 
 173. Id. at 235. 
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B. The Hankerson Majority’s Analysis 
Hankerson raised three issues: (1) whether the 2005 
amendments (and the attendant resentencing jury trial) applied 
retrospectively to Hankerson;174 (2) whether application of the 2005 
amendments was barred by the Constitution’s Ex Post Facto 
Clause;175 and (3) whether the resentencing trial was barred by 
double jeopardy.176  The first two issues are beyond the scope of this 
note.177  The Minnesota Supreme Court resolved all three issues in 
the state’s favor.178  The court then affirmed the post-conviction 
court’s decision to impanel a jury to retry the aggravating factors.179  
On August 24, 2007, after deliberating for two hours, a jury found 
all four of the original aggravating factors.180  The trial judge then 
resentenced Hankerson to the same ten-year upward departure.181
The Hankerson court based its double-jeopardy analysis on 
“termination of risk” logic, holding that Hankerson was not twice 
put in jeopardy because her jeopardy never terminated.182  The 
court eschewed the same offense issue, holding that the 
resentencing trial was a continuation of the first prosecution.183  
The court seemed to read Sattazahn and Lockhart as establishing a 
general rule that jeopardy is not terminated unless a fact finder 
acquits or there was insufficient evidence to submit the question to 
 174. Id. 
 175. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3; Hankerson, 723 N.W.2d at 241. 
 176. Id.  at 236. 
 177. Suffice it to say, the Hankerson court held that the 2005 amendments to 
section 244.10 subdivision 5(a) did apply to Hankerson, but the amendments to 
the sentencing guidelines did not.  Id.  However, the 2005-amended section 244.10 
interpreted with the pre-2005-amended version of the sentencing guidelines 
allowed impaneling a jury for resentencing.  Id.  As to the second issue, the court 
held that the Ex Post Facto Clause did not bar the retrospective application of 
section 244.10 subdivision 5(a) because the change was procedural, not 
substantive, and operated to Hankerson’s advantage.  Id. at 243. 
 178. Id. at 236, 237, 243. 
 179. Id. at 244. 
 180. Cullen, supra note 157, at 6A. 
 181. Id.  Judge Stacey, who presided over the original trial, told Hankerson 
“I’d give you more time if I could.”  Jen Cullen, Leniency Denied in ‘Shocking’ Rape 
Case, RED WING REPUBLICAN EAGLE, Oct. 13, 2007, at 6A.  Verbalizing the 
defendant’s interest in repose, perhaps, Hankerson said of her five-year-long 
criminal proceedings, “This has not been an easy journey.”  Id. at 1A. 
 182. Hankerson, 723 N.W.2d at 237. 
 183. Id. 
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the jury.184  Since no fact finder had acquitted Hankerson of the 
aggravating factors, Hankerson’s jeopardy never terminated.185
Moreover, the majority’s analogy with Lockhart seems 
particularly strong.  The Hankerson majority stated that, as in 
Lockhart, the defendant’s sentence was reversed but not the 
defendant’s conviction.186  Since double jeopardy did not bar 
resentencing in Lockhart and the attendant second trial to find 
aggravating factors, then neither did it bar resentencing and retrial 
in Hankerson.187  The Hankerson court also cited two other decisions, 
one from Arizona and one from Oregon, each of which resolved 
the double-jeopardy issue in the same manner.188
IV.  ANALYSIS OF THE HANKERSON DECISION 
A.  A Hypothetical 
Consider the following hypothetical.  A defendant is charged 
with simple possession of a controlled substance and possession 
with intent to distribute, the former being a lesser included offense 
of the latter.  A jury convicts on both counts.  On appeal, the 
defendant successfully argues that the trial judge erred when 
instructing the jury on intent, and the appellate court overturns the 
possession with intent to distribute conviction.  The appellate court 
leaves the conviction of the lesser included offense untouched, 
remands for retrial of the greater offense, and directs the trial court 
to estop the defendant from challenging his guilt as to the simple 
possession charge.  The state need only prove intent, and failing 
that, the defendant will be guilty of the lesser included offense.  
Functionally, this is exactly what the Minnesota Supreme Court 
allowed except that in Hankerson the reversal concerned the 
functional equivalent of an element of an offense rather than a 
legislatively labeled element of an offense. 
The maneuver is a two-step procedural dance; both steps are 
foreign to Minnesota when the reversal involves traditional 
elements of an offense.  The first step is retain and retry—or 
 184. Id. at 238. 
 185. Id. at 238–39. 
 186. Id. at 239. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. at 240 (citing Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002); State v. Sawatzky, 
125 P.3d 722 (Or. 2005)). 
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retaining a conviction of a lesser included offense and retrying only 
the greater offense when the greater-offense conviction is 
overturned.  That is, a court retains a conviction of a lesser offense 
but retries the greater offense.  If the second jury convicts on the 
greater offense, then the prior lesser-offense conviction merges 
with the second conviction.  If the second jury acquits, then the 
first conviction stands.  The second step is the prosecution’s use of 
offensive collateral estoppel. 
B. The Use of Double-Jeopardy Precedent 
The first step—retrying the greater offense while retaining the 
conviction of the lesser offense—raises double-jeopardy concerns.  
Brown v. Ohio189 stated quite plainly that the state cannot prosecute 
a defendant for the greater offense after successfully prosecuting 
the defendant for the lesser offense.190  Brown involved a second 
prosecution where the state charged and successfully convicted the 
defendant of only the lesser offense, without charging the greater 
offense.191  Our hypothetical, and Hankerson, involve an overturned 
greater offense that was originally charged along with the lesser 
offense.192  Brown stated that “where . . . a person has been tried and 
convicted for a crime . . . he cannot be a second time tried . . . for 
the same offense.”193  For our hypothetical and Hankerson, if the 
retrial of the greater offense is a “second time tried,” then Brown 
would bar the retrial of the greater offense without first reversing 
the lesser offense.194  On the contrary, several states permit the 
retain and retry practice, but only a few decisions emanate from the 
particular state’s supreme court.195  The arguments for retain and 
retry in those cases mostly parallel those made in Hankerson.  
Namely, absent an acquittal, the defendant’s jeopardy has not 
 189. 432 U.S. 161 (1977). 
 190. Id. at 166. 
 191. Id. at 162–63. 
 192. Hankerson, 723 N.W.2d at 248.  See also supra Part IV.A. 
 193. Brown, 432 U.S. at 168. 
 194. See id. at 165. 
 195. See, e.g., Alley v. State, 704 P.2d 233 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985); State v. 
Rodriguez, 7 P.3d 148 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000); United States v. Allen, 755 A.2d 402 
(D.C. 2000); Bell v. State, 292 S.E.2d 402 (Ga. 1982); Commonwealth v. Pinero, 
729 N.E.2d 679 (Mass. App. Ct. 2000); People v. Gonzalez, 496 N.W.2d 312 (Mich. 
Ct. App. 1992); State v. Snellbaker, 639 A.2d 384 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994); 
People v. Martinez, 905 P.2d 715 (N.M. 1995); Commonwealth v. McCane, 539 
A.2d 340 (Pa. 1988). 
22
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 4 [2008], Art. 9
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol34/iss4/9
10. CARTER-STIGLITZ - ADC 6/11/2008  6:05:00 PM 
2008] HANKERSON V. STATE 1539 
 
terminated.  Consider, for example, the Hankerson court’s double-
jeopardy analysis.196
As Justice Page argued in his dissent, nearly all of the double-
jeopardy authority on which the majority relied involves cases 
where the defendant’s conviction was overturned.197  But the 
termination of jeopardy by acquittal analysis makes little sense 
when the defendant remains convicted, as in Hankerson.198  
Applying the acquittal test in these circumstances yields absurd 
results: the prosecution may prosecute a convicted criminal for the 
same offense ad infinitum so long as defendant is never 
acquitted.199  Surely, the majority did not intend this.  A 
counterargument is that while the acquittal test may not apply 
generally, it does apply when a defendant’s conviction or sentence 
is vacated.  But this is contrary to the traditional dichotomy 
between trials and sentencing.200  For double-jeopardy purposes, the 
ordeal of a trial “already is behind” the defendant when sentencing 
occurs.201
Notwithstanding the results of the conceptual abstraction 
described above, does precedent, by way of analogy, support 
severing an aggravating factor from the underlying offense and 
retrying only the aggravating factor?  The Monge majority said yes 
under any circumstances, including an acquittal, because 
sentencing hearings do not trigger double-jeopardy concerns.202  
But Justice Scalia’s dissent argued that double jeopardy applies, at 
least in the case of an implied acquittal.203  Accordingly, the Monge 
dissent lends some support to Justice Page’s argument.  However, 
even if Scalia’s Monge dissent has won the day as Blakely suggests, it 
can be distinguished from Hankerson because Hankerson was never 
acquitted of the aggravating factor.204  The majority can also rely on 
Lockhart to support its argument.205  The Hankerson majority stated 
 196. Hankerson, 723 N.W.2d at 236–41.  See also supra Part III. 
 197. Hankerson, 723 N.W.2d at 250 (Page, J., dissenting).  The sole exception is 
Lockhart, discussed below.  See also supra Part III. 
 198. Hankerson, 723 N.W.2d at 238–39 (majority opinion). 
 199. Id. at 250 (Page, J., dissenting). 
 200. United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 136 (1980) (asserting that 
“the double jeopardy considerations that bar reprosecution after an acquittal do 
not prohibit review of a sentence”). 
 201. Id. 
 202. Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721, 730 (1998). 
 203. Id. at 741 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 204. Hankerson, 723 N.W.2d at 238–39. 
 205. Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33, 40 (1988) (holding that resentencing 
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that defendant Nelson’s “sentence, but not his conviction, was 
reversed” in Lockhart just as in Hankerson.206  But the dissent 
interpreted Lockhart differently, stating that Nelson’s “conviction as 
an habitual criminal” was reversed, unlike the situation in 
Hankerson.207  The answer as to whether recidivism is a separate 
offense or merely an enhancement lies in Arkansas state law (where 
Nelson was convicted),208 which holds that recidivism is not a 
separate offense.209
Thus, the Hankerson majority is correct: Nelson’s sentence, but 
not his conviction, was reversed.210  Indeed, it is from Lockhart that 
the Hankerson majority draws most of its support for its termination 
of jeopardy logic.211  In Lockhart, defendant’s sentence was vacated, 
not for insufficient evidence, but for incorrectly admitted 
evidence.212  As the Hankerson majority’s argument goes, the 
defendant’s jeopardy never terminated and no double-jeopardy 
concerns were triggered.213  Likewise, Hankerson’s sentence was 
vacated because the aggravating factors were not submitted to a 
jury, not because of insufficiency of evidence; and no acquittal 
means no termination of jeopardy.214  Thus, Lockhart seems to 
strongly support the Hankerson majority.215
Nevertheless, Lockhart and Hankerson are as similar as chalk 
and cheese.216  Lockhart involved prior convictions, which are not 
defendant after it was discovered that defendant’s prior-conviction had been 
pardoned based on a different conviction did not violate double jeopardy). 
 206. Hankerson, 723 N.W.2d at 239. 
 207. Id. at 250 n.3 (Page, J., dissenting).  Curiously, the majority states that the 
“dissent does not discuss Lockhart.”  Id. at 239. 
 208. See Davis v. Bennett, 400 F.2d 279, 281 (8th Cir. 1968) (holding that 
whether recidivism was a separate offense was a question of state law). 
 209. Atkins v. State, 701 S.W.2d 109, 112 (Ark. 1985) (interpreting the statute 
in effect when Nelson was sentenced). 
 210. Lockhart, 488 U.S. at 40. 
 211. Hankerson, 723 N.W.2d at 238. 
 212. Lockhart, 488 U.S. at 40. 
 213. Hankerson, 723 N.W.2d at 238. 
 214. Id. 
 215. See id. 
 216. “Chalk and cheese are opposed in various proverbial expressions as things 
differing greatly in their qualities or value, though their appearance is not unlike, 
and their names alliterate.”  2 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1075 (J.A. Simpson & 
E.S.C. Weiner eds., 2d ed. 1989).  See also Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 302 
n.5 (2004) (arguing that two authorities were fundamentally different though they 
might appear similar at first glance, i.e., that the authorities were as “similar as 
chalk and cheese”). 
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required to be submitted to a jury.217  Retrying these issues does not 
involve the “hallmarks of a trial,” and does not involve the double-
jeopardy concerns of jury-found aggravating factors.218  Accordingly, 
Lockhart falls under the Almendarez-Torres exception.219  This 
exception allows the fact of a prior conviction to be found by a 
judge, but not by a jury.220  Thus, Lockhart does not trigger the 
constitutional protections of jury review or double jeopardy.221  
Hankerson involved facts that must be decided by a jury in a 
proceeding that will have all of the “hallmarks of trial.”  While 
remanding the question of recidivism to a trial court and leaving 
the underlying offense untouched was appropriate in Lockhart, it 
did not justify a second trial in Hankerson.222
The Hankerson majority also argued that jeopardy should not 
have been terminated because Hankerson still could have 
petitioned the United States Supreme Court for review.223  The 
court did not explain its reasoning, but the argument is probably 
that since the Supreme Court could have overturned Hankerson’s 
conviction, her jeopardy must not have terminated in order to 
allow for retrial.  But why should jeopardy terminate with the 
possibility of direct review rather than with the possibility of 
collateral attack?  After all, whether a conviction is overturned on 
direct or collateral attack does not enter into the double-jeopardy 
calculus.224  Following this logic to its end, double jeopardy would 
not protect, e.g., a defendant convicted of a lesser included offense 
from being prosecuted for the greater offense years after the first 
conviction,225 because jeopardy would not have terminated.  The 
Minnesota Supreme Court’s termination of jeopardy analysis is 
reminiscent of the overly mechanical application of the waiver 
theory that led to the Bryan rule.226
 217. Lockhart, 488 U.S. at 42. 
 218. Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721, 726 (1998). 
 219. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 488 (2000) (citing Almendarez-
Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998)). 
 220. Id. 
 221. See Monge, 524 U.S. at 734. 
 222. Lockhart, 488 U.S. at 42. 
 223. Hankerson v. State, 723 N.W.2d 232, 239 (Minn. 2006). 
 224. United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 466 (1964). 
 225. In Tateo, the defendant served seven years before overturning his appeal 
on collateral attack, and being retried.  See United States v. Tateo, 214 F. Supp. 
560, 562 (S.D.N.Y 1963).  In Lockhart, it was “several” years.  Lockhart, 488 U.S. at 
37. 
 226. Bryan v. United States, 338 U.S. 552, 559–60 (1950) (noting that where an 
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Instead of becoming mired in semantics, analyzing policy 
interests is mandated by the Supreme Court.227  Policy suggests that 
double jeopardy should apply in Hankerson.  When Hankerson was 
resentenced, she was already tried and convicted of criminal sexual 
conduct.228  Society’s interest in preventing the guilty from going 
free is thus minimal.  Hankerson, on the other hand, endured a 
second trial.229  Moreover, the state did not indicate that it intended 
to seek a departure from the presumptive sentence until after 
Hankerson was convicted.230  In short, the state received the 
benefits of having honed its strategy during the first trial but bore 
no risk at the second trial because Hankerson always remained 
convicted.  The state got a second bite of the apple after having 
already swallowed the first.  Of course, the state has a legitimate 
interest in seeing that convicted criminals are punished according 
to the offense that they committed, including all aggravating 
factors. 
The counter to this point regarding the state’s interest is that 
the interest could be satisfied by overturning Hankerson’s criminal 
sexual conduct conviction and retrying it and the aggravating 
factors.  If a second trial would be too risky for the state, e.g., a key 
witness’s testimony can no longer be obtained, the state could 
always reassess its position and elect that Hankerson remain 
convicted of the lesser offense.  Instead, the Court implicitly 
endorsed the doctrine of retain and retry.231  In other words, if 
aggravating factors are really the functional equivalent of 
traditional elements, this begs the question of whether the state 
may retain a conviction of a traditional lesser offense and retry just 
the overturned greater offense. 
accused, after a verdict of guilty and within five days, renewed a motion for 
acquittal and for a new trial and both motions were denied, then the reviewing 
court on reversing the conviction for lack of evidence has power to order a new 
trial if it believes that justice would be best served). 
 227. See Tateo, 377 U.S. at 466 (analyzing various theories advanced to support 
the permissibility of a defendant’s right to retrial). 
 228. Hankerson, 723 N.W.2d at 234. 
 229. Id. at 243–44. 
 230. Id. at 244 (Page, J., dissenting).  Interestingly, the majority stated, “if the 
state in the first trial had not sought an aggravated sentence . . . double jeopardy 
might prevent retrial . . . .”  Id. at 238.  Evidently, the Hankerson majority 
considered the post-jury-conviction sentencing hearing part of the “first trial.”  
This argument is specious: double jeopardy primarily protects from the stress and 
rigors of a jury trial that decides guilt or innocence.  See United States v. 
DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 136 (1980). 
 231. See supra Part IV.B for discussion of retain and retry doctrine. 
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C. Offensive Collateral Estoppel 
1. Basics and Supreme Court Precedent 
The second step in the Hankerson dance, offensive collateral 
estoppel, raises Sixth Amendment jury rights issues, Fourteenth 
Amendment due process rights issues, and, arguably, double-
jeopardy issues.232  Hankerson’s resentencing involved the functional 
equivalent of offensive collateral estoppel: Hankerson could not 
challenge her conviction for criminal sexual conduct during the 
second trial.233
Collateral estoppel prohibits an identical issue from being 
relitigated when the issue has been decided in a previous 
litigation.234  Collateral estoppel, at least in civil proceedings, may 
operate offensively as well as defensively.235  The doctrine operates 
defensively when a party asserting a claim or prosecution is estopped 
from litigating an issue that the party lost in a prior litigation.236  
The doctrine operates offensively when a party asserting a claim or 
prosecution uses it to establish an issue of the party’s claim.237  
Courts disfavor offensive collateral estoppel.238  In the past, civil 
collateral estoppel required that the party using it, and the party 
against whom it was used, both be parties to the prior litigation.239  
In many jurisdictions, “strangers” to the prior litigation can use the 
prior litigation’s results offensively or defensively.240  Finally, 
 232. U.S. CONST. amends. VI, XIV.  See, e.g., United States v. Gallardo-Mendez, 
150 F.3d 1240, 1244 (10th Cir. 1998); United States v. Pelullo, 14 F.3d 881, 896 (3d 
Cir. 1994). 
 233. Presumably, Hankerson would have challenged the conviction during the 
second proceeding, because she continued to maintain her innocence after being 
sentenced in 2002.  Burroughs, supra note 156, at 15. 
 234. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 (1979).  In most 
jurisdictions, collateral estoppel requires four elements: (1) the precluded issue is 
identical to the one in the prior litigation; (2) a final judgment on the merits; (3) 
the party against whom collateral estoppel is used was a party to or in privity with a 
party to the prior litigation; and (4) the estopped party had a full and fair 
opportunity to litigate the estopped issue.  Aufderhar v. Data Dispatch, Inc., 452 
N.W.2d 648, 650 (Minn. 1990) (internal citations omitted). 
 235. United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 159–60 (1984).
 236. See Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 329 
(1971). 
 237. Parklane, 439 U.S. at 329. 
 238. See id. 
 239. Id. at 347 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 240. Aufderhar v. Data Dispatch, Inc., 452 N.W.2d 648, 651 (Minn. 1990) 
(allowing non-mutual defensive collateral estoppel); Green v. City of Coon Rapids, 
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offensive collateral estoppel can arise in two distinct procedural 
postures: (1) during retrial after a reviewing court has overturned a 
conviction; and (2) during a second, completely separate, 
prosecution.241  The posture in Hankerson is of the first type.242
In Ashe v. Swenson,243 the United States Supreme Court held 
that collateral estoppel is inherent in the Fifth Amendment’s 
protection against double jeopardy.244  Ashe was charged with 
robbing one of six poker players.245  The state’s evidence did not 
convince the jury that Ashe was one of the robbers, and the jury 
acquitted Ashe.246  The prosecution admitted that this first trial was 
nothing more than a “dry run,” and charged Ashe with robbing 
one of the other six poker players.247  Evidently, the state believed 
that it had six chances to convict Ashe, one for each poker player.248  
In Ashe, the sole issue in dispute was whether Ashe was one of the 
robbers.249  The Court held that Ashe could estop the State from 
claiming that he was one of the robbers: the issue had already been 
decided by a jury, and the State could not relitigate it.250  Thus, Ashe 
is an example of defensive collateral estoppel. 
The United States Supreme Court has not yet directly ruled on 
whether the prosecution may use offensive collateral estoppel.251  In 
Simpson v. Florida,252 however, the Court stated that “the prosecutor 
could not, while trying the case under review, have laid down the 
first jury verdict before the trial judge and demanded an 
instruction . . . that, as a matter of law” defendant was guilty of the 
485 N.W.2d 712, 718 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (offensive collateral estoppel may be 
appropriate where it is not unfair to defendant). 
 241. Compare State v. Scarbrough, 181 S.W.3d 650 (Tenn. 2005) (holding that 
a state’s offensive use of collateral estoppel at retrial would violate the defendant’s 
right to a jury trial), with Hernandez-Uribe v. United States, 515 F.2d 20 (8th Cir. 
1975) (holding that where the defendant had previously pled guilty to the same 
charge, he was precluded by collateral estoppel from relitigating an issue in a 
second prosecution). 
 242. Hankerson v. State, 723 N.W.2d 232, 234 (Minn. 2006). 
 243. 397 U.S. 436 (1970). 
 244. Id. at 445. 
 245. Id. at 437. 
 246. Id. at 439. 
 247. Id. at 447. 
 248. See id. at 441. 
 249. Id. at 438. 
 250. Id. at 446. 
 251. See Donald L. Catlett, Charles D. Moreland & Janet M. Thompson, 
Collateral Estoppel in Criminal Cases: How and Where Does it Apply?, 62 J. Mo. BAR 370, 
372 (2006). 
 252. 403 U.S. 384 (1971). 
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particular offense.253  Notably, this comment was obiter dictum, 
because Simpson concerned defensive collateral estoppel.254  Also, as 
one commentator arguing for offensive collateral estoppel points 
out, the hypothetical in Simpson involved the use of offensive 
collateral estoppel in a subsequent, independent proceeding, not 
after a case had been remanded for retrial, as in Hankerson.255  
Nevertheless, in dicta and dissents the Court has repeatedly 
condemned offensive collateral estoppel in criminal cases: “[A] 
conviction in the first prosecution would not excuse the 
Government from proving the same facts a second time.”256  Chief 
Justice Burger argued that if a defendant is “convicted at the first 
trial, presumably no court would then hold that he was thereby . . . 
foreclosed from litigating [an essential element of the first 
conviction] at the second trial.”257
2. The Circuits’ and States’ Take 
With little guidance from the Supreme Court, most of the 
circuit courts have held that the Government may not use offensive 
collateral estoppel.  The Third,258 Ninth,259 Tenth,260 and Eleventh261 
Circuits have prohibited it.  In United States v. Pelullo, the Third 
Circuit based its prohibition on the Sixth Amendment’s right to a 
jury trial.262  Offensive collateral estoppel “interferes with the power 
of the jury to determine every element of the crime, impinging 
upon the accused’s right to a jury trial.”263  This view is entirely 
consistent with the controlling Minnesota law: a defendant has a 
“right to a trial by jury and thus [is] entitled as a matter of 
constitutional due process to have all essential elements of the 
 253. Id. at 386. 
 254. See id. at 384. 
 255. Mitchell Keiter, The Mauled Verdict: The Knoller Case Shows Why Res Judicata 
Should Protect Partial Convictions as Well as Acquittals, 33 MCGEORGE L. REV. 493, 503 
(2002). 
 256. United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 710 n.15 (1993). 
 257. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 464–65 (1970) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
 258. United States v. Pelullo, 14 F.3d 881, 896 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 259. United States v. Smith-Baltiher, 424 F.3d 913, 920 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 260. United States v. Gallardo-Mendez, 150 F.3d 1240, 1244 (10th Cir. 1998). 
 261. United States v. Harnage, 976 F.2d 633, 636 (11th Cir. 1992). 
 262. Pelullo, 14 F.3d at 896. 
 263. Id. (citing State v. Ingenito, 432 A.2d 912, 915–16 (N.J. 1981)). 
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crime proven to the jury’s satisfaction by proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt.”264
Other circuits have based their holdings on the Due Process 
Clause.265  The Tenth Circuit balanced the interests of the two 
stakeholders—the defendant and the government—and found the 
defendant’s stake weightier.266  While judicial economy justified the 
use of offensive collateral estoppel in civil cases, it did not justify its 
use in criminal proceedings.267  Minnesota’s own Eighth Circuit is 
the only circuit to have endorsed the use of offensive collateral 
estoppel.268
The states have taken a similarly negative view of offensive 
collateral estoppel in criminal cases.269  The New Jersey Supreme 
Court held that when offensive collateral estoppel is used, “the 
jury’s capacity to discharge fully its paramount deliberative and 
decisional responsibilities is irretrievably compromised.”270  The 
Michigan Supreme Court emphasized the need to give the second 
jury the ability to make its own judgment on all elements of the 
offense.271
3. Argument Against Offensive Collateral Estoppel 
Notwithstanding the chorus of opinions prohibiting the use of 
offensive collateral estoppel in criminal cases, policy does lend 
some support to the practice.  The first such policy rationale is 
 264. State v. Bluhm, 457 N.W.2d 256, 260 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990), rev’d on other 
grounds, 460 N.W.2d 22, 24 (Minn. 1990). 
 265. E.g., Gallardo-Mendez, 150 F.3d at 1246 (arguing that the use of a guilty 
plea by the government to collaterally estop a defendant from relitigating an issue 
in a later proceeding violates the Due Process Clause). 
 266. Id. at 1244. 
 267. Id. 
 268. Hernandez-Uribe v. United States, 515 F.2d 20, 22 (8th Cir. 1975).  
Hernandez-Uribe is also notable because it involved a situation where the 
prosecution used collateral estoppel in a second prosecution completely separate 
from the prior prosecution rather than during the retrial of an overturned 
conviction.  Id. at 21.  One commentary has put forth a strong argument for 
allowing the prosecution to use offensive collateral estoppel.  Keiter, supra note 
255, at 503–04. 
 269. Gutierrez v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 376 (Ct. App. 1994); People 
v. Goss, 521 N.W.2d 312 (Mich. 1994); State v. Johnson, 594 A.2d 1288 (N.H. 
1991); State v. Ingenito, 432 A.2d 912 (N.J. 1981); State v. Scarbrough, 181 S.W.3d 
650 (Tenn. 2005). 
 270. Ingenito, 432 A.2d at 916. 
 271. Goss, 521 N.W.2d at 316. 
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judicial economy.272  Offensive collateral estoppel would free up 
court resources.273  Avoiding inconsistent jury verdicts, and the 
concomitant appearance of jackpot justice, is also a good reason for 
advocating offensive collateral estoppel.274  Proponents of offensive 
collateral estoppel in criminal cases have suggested that a court 
should balance various factors to determine whether to allow 
collateral estoppel in a particular instance.275  These factors include: 
(1) whether the issue and defendant are identical; (2) whether 
defendant had full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue; (3) 
whether the prior charge was a felony; (4) whether the sentence in 
the prior proceeding was serious enough to motivate the defendant 
to mount a full defense or appeal; and (5) whether the prosecution 
acted in bad faith.276
But, as discussed above, these policy concerns may not be 
enough when balanced against a criminal defendant’s interests.  In 
particular, the concern for consistent jury verdicts is moot in 
criminal cases where the jury, in spite of clear facts to the contrary, 
may find the defendant not guilty simply to quash the 
prosecution.277  On balance, judicial economy pales in comparison 
to a defendant’s and society’s stake in maintaining a judicial system 
that reasonably ensures innocent defendants are not convicted. 
At least one commentator has suggested that the United States 
Supreme Court may have implicitly endorsed offensive collateral 
estoppel in criminal cases.278  This is probably not the case.  In Neder 
v. United States,279 the trial court erroneously withheld an element of 
an offense from the jury.280  The Court held that the error of failing 
to submit an element to a jury was susceptible to harmless-error 
analysis.281
So, as an example, return to the possession-with-intent 
hypothetical described above.282  Assume that the judge fails to 
 272. Scarbrough, 181 S.W.3d at 654. 
 273. See id. at 654–55. 
 274. See id. at 654 (stating that the doctrine of collateral estoppel “prevents 
inconsistent decisions”). 
 275. Id. 
 276. Id. 
 277. See Amar, supra note 84, at 1843–44 (discussing jury nullification in the 
context of double jeopardy). 
 278. Keiter, supra note 255, at 511. 
 279. 527 U.S. 1 (1999). 
 280. Id. at 6–7. 
 281. Id. at 15. 
 282. See supra Part IV.A. 
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submit the possession element to the jury, but the jury convicts 
anyway.  A reviewing court is allowed to assume the jury’s verdict 
concerning the intent element and to review the record to 
determine whether no reasonable jury could have failed to find 
possession.  Functionally, the jury’s verdict estops the reviewing 
court from considering the jury’s findings.  The argument goes as 
follows: if the defendant has no right to relitigate issues found by a 
jury when a reviewing court sits as a second fact finder, then such 
defendant should have no right to relitigate issues when a jury sits 
as the second fact finder.283
But why require that a single jury find every element of an 
offense?  Simple, it makes it harder to convict.  Consider the 
reasons for having double jeopardy, the right to a jury trial, the 
right to counsel, and the right to a grand jury: “They were, every 
one, intended to make it more difficult before the doors of a prison 
closed on a man because of his trial.”284
Now consider how this works with offensive collateral estoppel.  
Go back to the possession-with-intent hypothetical, but assume that 
Vegas has called the odds: there is a fifty percent chance that the 
jury will find possession, a fifty percent chance that it will find 
intent, and that makes a twenty-five percent chance that a single 
jury will convict for possession with intent to distribute.  The jury 
finds both elements, but the judge errs in instructing the jury on 
intent.  If collateral estoppel is allowed, the State need only retry 
the intent element and now has a fifty percent chance of getting its 
 283. See Keiter, supra note 255, at 512. 
 284. The rest of Justice Black’s quotation deserves reproduction: 
Why did they write the Bill of Rights?  They practically all relate to the 
way cases should be tried.  And practically all of them make it more 
difficult to convict people of crime.  What about guaranteeing a man a 
right to a lawyer?  Of course that makes it more difficult to convict him.  
What about saying he shall not be compelled to be a witness against 
himself?  That makes it more difficult to convict him.  What about no 
unreasonable search or seizure shall be made?  That makes it more 
difficult.  They were written to make it more difficult.  And what the 
Court does is to try to follow what they wrote, and say you've got to try 
people in this way.  Why did they want a jury?  They wanted it so they 
wouldn't be subjected to one judge that might hang them or convict 
them for a political crime, or something of that kind.  And so they had 
juries.  And they said the same thing about an indictment.  That's what 
they put it in for.  They were, every one, intended to make it more 
difficult before the doors of a prison closed on a man because of his trial. 
The Supreme Court (PBS television broadcast Jan.-Feb. 2007), available at 
http://www.pbs.org/wnet/supremecourt/about/pop_transcript3.html. 
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possession with intent conviction.  If it is not allowed, then the state 
is back to the twenty-five percent chance. 
Such a case is the sporting theory of justice to an extreme, but 
it illustrates two points: (1) offensive collateral estoppel is 
inconsistent with the Fifth and Sixth Amendments’ overarching 
goal of making conviction more difficult; and (2) Neder does not 
justify collateral estoppel.  The first point is arguably obvious 
enough, so consider the second.  Neder allows a reviewing court to 
depend on a jury’s verdict in collateral estoppel fashion only if no 
reasonable jury could not find the element.285  That is, Neder only applies 
when Vegas says the odds are one hundred percent.286  In such a 
case, the element has no effect on defendant’s total odds.  In the 
example above, if intent is one hundred percent certain, and 
possession is fifty percent certain, then the chance of finding both 
intent and possession are the same as finding just the intent 
element: fifty percent.  Thus, Neder is limited to the special 
circumstance in which submitting the element to a jury has no 
effect on a defendant’s chances of being convicted, and does not 
justify offensive collateral estoppel.287
Unfortunately, the Hankerson court did not address any of 
these collateral estoppel issues.  In a footnote, the court suggested 
the reason for this omission: 
Hankerson also argues that on remand the state should 
have to retry all elements of the offenses for which she was 
convicted.  But Hankerson did not seek review of this 
issue and she does not base this argument on double 
jeopardy grounds.  Further, our own cases involving 
remands to correct erroneous sentences have limited the 
remand to resentencing, without a retrial on the 
underlying charges.288
Hankerson was arguably correct in not basing her argument 
on double-jeopardy grounds.  None of the cases discussed above 
 285. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 17 (1999) (holding that “where a 
reviewing court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that the omitted element 
was uncontested and supported by overwhelming evidence, such that the jury 
verdict would have been the same absent the error, the erroneous instruction is 
properly found to be harmless.”). 
 286. See id. 
 287. See id. at 19 (stating that if the record contains no evidence that could 
rationally lead to a contrary finding with respect to the omitted element, no 
constitutional rights are denigrated by disallowing offensive collateral estoppel). 
 288. Hankerson v. State, 723 N.W.2d 232, 240 n.5 (Minn. 2006) (citations 
omitted). 
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rejected offensive collateral estoppel on double-jeopardy grounds.  
But, there is at least one double-jeopardy argument against 
offensive collateral estoppel in criminal cases.  The Double 
Jeopardy Clause states “nor shall any person” be subject to double 
jeopardy.289  It grants rights to defendants, not to the state.  If a 
defendant’s right to use collateral estoppel comes from the Double 
Jeopardy Clause, then from where does the prosecution’s right to 
use collateral estoppel come?  One answer is that since the Fifth 
Amendment grants defendants the right to use collateral estoppel, 
it impliedly denies the state the right to use it, expressio unius est 
exclusio alterius.290  Or, to put it more figuratively, to draw from the 
Fifth Amendment a conclusion that so empowers the state at 
defendants’ expense borders on the perverse. 
But even if Hankerson had sought review of the offensive 
collateral estoppel issue, the Hankerson court might well have 
rejected the argument based on the dichotomy between the 
sentencing elements and the elements of an offense.291  Indeed, all 
of the case law on collateral estoppel cited above involved 
traditional elements of offenses, not Blakely-anointed elements of 
offenses.292  But does this dichotomy withstand Blakely?  Should 
offensive collateral estoppel be viewed differently when aggravating 
factors rather than traditional elements of an offense are retried?  
No, because aggravating factors are the functional equivalent of an 
offense, and offensive collateral estoppel involves the same Sixth 
Amendment jury right that was invoked in Apprendi.293  But what if 
the defendant has requested a bifurcated trial, and essentially 
waived her right to have a single jury find all elements in one 
sitting?  Surely, a defendant should not be given the chance to 
undo this waiver.  In any case, the Minnesota Supreme Court only 
hinted at its opinion concerning these issues in Hankerson.294
 289. U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added). 
 290. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius is an interpretive canon holding that to 
express or include one thing implies the exclusion of the other.  BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 620 (8th ed. 2004). 
 291. See Hankerson, 723 N.W.2d at 240 n.5 (commenting that the previous cases 
“involving remands to correct erroneous sentences have limited the remand to 
resentencing, without a retrial on the underlying charges”). 
 292. See, e.g., Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000); Neder, 527 U.S. at 
16; People v. Goss, 521 N.W.2d 312 (Mich. 1994); State v. Scarbrough, 181 S.W.3d 
650 (Tenn. 2005). 
 293. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 476. 
 294. See Hankerson, 723 N.W.2d at 237–40. 
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D. Avoided Issue: How Do Aggravating Factors Factor in Double 
Jeopardy? 
Although the Hankerson court disposed of the double-jeopardy 
issue by holding that Hankerson’s jeopardy had not terminated,295 it 
did not define the role of aggravating factors for same-offense 
analysis.  For example, may the state re-prosecute an individual with 
an aggravating “vulnerable victim” factor after a prior jury has 
acquitted on that individual aggravating factor?  What if the jury 
acquitted defendant of all aggravating factors?  These situations are 
likely to occur when a reviewing court overturns a conviction. 
The Washington Supreme Court addressed the issue in State v. 
Benn.296  The state charged defendant Benn with murder for 
shooting and killing Jack Dethlefsen and Michael Nelson.297  Along 
with murder, the state alleged two aggravating factors: the murders 
were a “single act” and the murders were “part of a common 
scheme or plan.”298  The jury convicted, found the “common 
scheme” aggravating factor, but left the jury verdict form blank as 
to the “single act.”299  The trial court sentenced Benn to death, but 
a federal district court granted a petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus and vacated the conviction.300
The state recharged Benn with murder and the “single act” 
aggravating factor.301  The second jury found Benn guilty of murder 
and found the “single act” aggravating factor.302  Benn appealed 
from the sentence, claiming that double jeopardy barred 
submitting the “single act” aggravating factor to the second jury.303  
In particular, Benn argued that the first jury’s blank verdict on the 
“single act” element was an implied acquittal and therefore double 
 295. Id. at 237–38 (“Where, as here, a defendant is convicted of murder and 
sentenced to life imprisonment, but appeals the conviction and succeeds in having 
it set aside, we have held that jeopardy has not terminated, so that the life 
sentence imposed in connection with the initial conviction raises no double-
jeopardy bar to a death sentence on retrial.”) (quoting Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 
537 U.S. 101, 106 (2003)). 
 296. 165 P.3d 1232, 1233 (Wash. 2007). 
 297. Benn v. Wood, No. C98-5131RDB, 2000 WL 1031361, at *1 (W.D. Wash. 
June 30, 2000). 
 298. Benn, 165 P.3d at 1233. 
 299. Id. 
 300. Id. (citing Benn, 2000 WL 1031361, at *5). 
 301. Id. at 1234. 
 302. Id. 
 303. Id. 
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jeopardy barred retrial.304  The State argued that “double jeopardy 
does not apply to aggravating factors.”305  The Washington Court of 
Appeals held that double jeopardy barred retrying the “single act” 
aggravating factor.306
The Washington Supreme Court disagreed.307  The court held 
that double jeopardy does not apply to individual aggravating 
factors.308  The only way double jeopardy applies to aggravating 
factors is when the jury acquits on all of the factors submitted to it.309  
The court based its reasoning on Scalia’s Sattazahn plurality 
opinion.310  The court read “double-jeopardy protections attach to 
[an] ‘acquittal’ on the offense of ‘murder plus aggravating 
circumstance(s)’” to imply that double jeopardy only attaches when 
all “aggravating circumstance(s)” are acquitted.311  But the 
Washington Supreme Court ignored language that it quoted: if a 
jury acquits “of one or more aggravating circumstances, double-
jeopardy protections attach.”312  It is difficult to understand how the 
Benn court interpreted acquittal of “one or more” factors to mean 
acquittal of “all” factors.  The Benn dissent is correct: “Sattazahn 
works against the majority.”313
Moreover, the analysis behind Apprendi, Ring, and Blakely 
strongly clash with the Benn rule.  Apprendi, Ring, and Blakely were 
concerned with the legislature’s ability to label a fact an aggravating 
factor rather than an element of an offense, and in so doing 
legislatively label away a defendant’s right to have a jury decide that 
fact.314  Imagine that Washington has only two aggravating factors 
 304. Id. 
 305. Id. 
 306. Id. (citing State v. Benn, 123 P.3d 484, 489 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005), rev’d, 
165 P.3d 1232 (Wash. 2007) (affirming the conviction, vacating the “single act” 
special verdict, and remanding the case for resentencing without the aggravating 
factor)). 
 307. Id. at 1233. 
 308. Id. at 1236. 
 309. See id. 
 310. Id.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. May, 898 A.2d 559, 570 (Pa. 2006) 
(“Sattazahn speaks to the situation where the original jury did not find any 
aggravating circumstances, and, thus, the sentence of life imprisonment was 
statutorily mandated.”) (emphasis omitted). 
 311. Benn, 165 P.3d at 1235 (quoting Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 
112 (2003)). 
 312. Id. (quoting Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 112) (emphasis added). 
 313. Id. at 1241 (Sanders, J., dissenting). 
 314. See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 299–300 (2004); Ring v. Arizona, 
536 U.S. 584, 604–05 (2002); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 494–97 (2000). 
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for robbery: “vulnerable victim” and “involving a gun.”  Assume 
that the jury finds the “vulnerable victim” factor but acquits on the 
“involving a gun” factor.  Defendant appeals and the reviewing 
court overturns the conviction.  This hypothetical is on all fours 
with Benn, and thus, double jeopardy does not bar re-prosecution 
of the “involving a gun” factor. 
Now suppose that the Washington legislature defined two 
separate offenses: robbery of a vulnerable person, and robbery with 
a gun.  If a jury acquits defendant of robbery with a gun, then 
double jeopardy clearly bars a second prosecution of robbery with a 
gun.  The Benn rule produces the exact problem that cases such as 
Apprendi sought to correct: the legislature does not have the power 
to label away defendants’ constitutional rights, be it the right to 
jury review or the protection against double jeopardy.315
V. CONCLUSION 
The Hankerson court relied on precedent that is 
distinguishable in critical ways from the facts and legal issues in 
Hankerson.  As a result, the court reached a conclusion that 
undercut double-jeopardy protection and one which endorsed the 
prosecution’s ability to retain and retry.  The Hankerson holding 
also implicitly endorsed offensive collateral estoppel in criminal 
cases.  In effect, the prosecution was allowed to try Hankerson’s 
case piecemeal, one element of the offense at one trial and another 
element at a second trial.  Moreover, by avoiding the “same 
offense” issue, the court left a number of important questions 
unanswered.  Most importantly, it avoided deciding whether 
aggravating factors factor in double-jeopardy analysis. 
 
 315. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494–97. 
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